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The determinants of firm performance after ownership 




In the last decade there has been an extensive debate in transition countries on whether 
ownership matters for company performance. The key issue has been whether outsider 
ownership outperforms insider ownership. This paper examines the influence of several 
variables - insider ownership, ownership by the state and municipalities, market share and 
the share of exports - on company performance in a sample of 488 Slovenian industrial 
companies after their ownership transformation. Econometric estimations demonstrate, 
contrary to the expectations based on previous Slovenian studies, that insider ownership 
does enhance performance. Market share has the expected positive influence on value 
added, whereas the influence of exports is negative due to the export reorientation to 
Western markets and the exchange rate policy in 1998. The effect of state ownership is 
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The findings of academic research around the world show that privately-owned companies 
are more efficient and profitable than comparable state-owned ones. Moreover, the 
empirical evidence available suggests that deregulation and market liberalisation can 
improve the efficiency of state-owned companies, but it seems that these reforms would be 
even more effective if accompanied by privatisation. As a consequence, privatisation, 
aiming to enhance the performance of state-owned companies, has been regarded as one  of 
the rectifying processes in transition economies. However, some disappointment followed 
mass privatisation. It was soon recognised that privatisation does not always bring its 
merits. It has in particular fallen short of the expectations in institutionally weak 
economies, mainly in the former Soviet Union. The reason for privatisation’s failure lies in 
the failure to provide the necessary supportive institutional environment such as the 
enforcement of financial discipline, competition and the free entry of new companies 
(Nellis, 1999). This leads to the conclusion that ownership is not the only determinant of 
company performance. Tandon (1995) argued that competition and market structure are 
just as, if not more, important as ownership when determining the efficiency outcomes of a 
firm. Similarly, by analysing the Chinese experience, Stiglitz (1998) showed that an 
economy might achieve more effective growth by focusing on competition first, leaving 
privatisation only until later.1 Another economist in the line is Rawski (1997), who stated 
that economists overemphasise the importance of ownership. However, in response to 
these economists Shirley (1998) pointed out that very few transition governments actually 
ever have the luxury of choosing between enhancing competition or changing ownership.  
 
There have been many attempts in transition economies to identify the determinants of 
firm performance in all stages of the mass privatisation process, including the post-
privatisation period. It is surprising just how little international interest Slovenia has 
attracted in these attempts. This is particularly striking if we recall that Slovenia is in the 
first group of accession countries for EU membership and, second, that Slovenia as one of 
the former Yugoslav republics had a different pre-transition governance structure than 
other CEE countries. Unlike in CEE countries, whose enterprises were state-owned, 
Slovenian firms and their managers were allowed a considerable degree of autonomy by 
the prevalent pattern of social ownership facilitating a self-management type of 
governance. To fill this gap, the aim of our paper is to present an initial assessment of the 
determinants affecting firm performance2 following mass privatisation in Slovenia and to 
contrast them with the findings for other transition countries.  
 
To select the most significant factors of performance we refer to the theoretical 
foundations and empirical studies in transition countries at all stages of privatisation. One 
factor widely examined in the empirical studies on transition in CEE countries is the 
impact of insider -  outsider ownership. Another commonly investigated and theoretically 
supported factor is competition. In former socialist countries operating within the 
framework of centrally planned systems this factor should have received special attention 
after the shift towards market economies. In a small economy, which Slovenia with its less 
than 2 million inhabitants clearly is, the export orientation of companies could be another 
decisive performance factor. Our analysis aims to investigate the role of all these factors in 
                                                 
1  For a survey of empirical findings, see Nellis (1999). 
2  Empirical studies use various names for performance measured by value added. In addition to 
performance, other terms such as productive efficiency and productivity have been used. In our paper, 
we use the terms performance and efficiency as synonyms.  
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the post-privatisation period in Slovenia. Some studies for Slovenia have already addressed 
this issue, but were unable to control simultaneously for the various factors that could 
influence performance. They, for example, clearly show that outsider-dominated 
companies perform better (Simoneti et al., 1998a, 1998b) but it is not clear whether this is 
in fact the result of the ownership form involved or if there are some other factors at work 
that make outsider companies outperform their insider counterparts.  
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the first section we review the theoretical 
foundations in order to select the relevant variables. We then examine empirical studies, 
investigating the influence of these variables in transition economies (i.e. former European 
socialist and communist countries). In the two following sections we explain the sample 
and the measurement of the variables selected. In the last section, we present the 
econometric framework and report the results. Finally, our findings are summarised and 
briefly contrasted with other empirical studies.  
 
1. The determinants of firm performance: theoretical background and empirical 
studies on transition economies 
 
Ownership 
Private versus public ownership 
 
On the basis of theoretical premises and numerous empirical studies it is now universally 
acknowledged that ownership is an important factor of company performance. There is a 
common theoretical belief tha t private ownership is superior to public or state ownership. 
The lower efficiency of public firms is demonstrated in their higher costs. Two theoretical 
explanations strive to explain the poor behaviour of public firms (Rowthorn, Chang, 1993): 
the “residual claimant theory” (its most important founders are Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972) and the “dispersed knowledge theory”.3 The residual claimant theory states that the 
absence of control over organised team production, which is typical of modern production 
and where individual working efforts are hard to measure, can lead to the problem of free-
riding and low effort. In private companies, the function of control lies in the hands of 
private owners who are entitled to the profit as “residual owners” and, therefore, aspire to 
profit maximisation. On the other hand, in state companies the aim of the state, as a 
company’s supervisor, is not profit maximisation. The absence of this aim leads to 
inefficient control. The dispersed knowledge theory arose in the framework of the Austrian 
School and claims that human knowledge is always dispersed and can never be transferred 
to others entirely (Hayek, 1949, 1986). The failure of central planning is only evidence of 
the inability to centralise dispersed knowledge within a hierarchical system. Consequently, 
the process of decision-making would be more efficient if handed over to private owners 
and their agents rather than to the state. Numerous modifications and antitheses have 
followed both theories.4 The debate on the comparative efficiency of private and state 
companies has mostly been limited to the issue of managerial incentives, to the functioning 
of competitive forces and to the differing goals of both types of companies, which argue 
                                                 
3  Clarke and Pitelis (1993) mentioned a third theoretical background, which is the neo-classical theory of 
ownership rights. 
4  More about this is found in Rowthorn and Chang (1993). Theoretical and empirical considerations of 
state ownership in the context of corporate governance are also addressed in the survey by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997).  
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for either the greater profitability or greater cost efficiency of private companies. 
Bureaucrats, who pursue their own political interests rather than social welfare, impose 
goals on managers that are different from those being imposed on private firms’ managers 
(Shapiro, Willig, 1990; Shleifer, Vishny, 1994). In line with this, Boycko et al. (1996) 
suggested that the inefficiency of public firms is primarily due to the over-employment 
strategies enforced by the politicians who control them. Privatisation leads to restructuring 
even when politicians try to subsidise former public firms in order to prevent any 
restructuring. As subsidising is more costly for politicians and harder to sustain than 
wasted profit through inefficiency, restructuring is more likely to occur so privatisation 
brings about efficiency gains. However, subsidising on a large scale may only continue in 
specific conditions of soft budget constraints (Kornai, 1980). State firms perform poorly 
under soft budget constraints, which were a characteristic of former socialist countries and 
might continue into the transition period, as their managers know that the government will 
subsidise them if they incur any losses. 
 
All of these arguments should form the basis for proving the lower efficiency of state 
companies. However, empirical studies have provided somewhat contentious findings. 
Based on a survey of single-country, single- industry, multi-national and multi- industry 
empirical studies, Megginson and Netter (2001) state that the empirical evidence clearly 
documents a significant (often dramatic) increase in the performance of privatised 
companies.5 Although this positive privatisation experience is chiefly drawn from OECD 
countries, recent assessments for non-OECD countries are also generally positive (Nellis, 
1999). Nevertheless, in public services (i.e. utilities) “empirical studies … have failed to 
establish the supremacy of the private sector when efficiency is assessed” (Tang, 1997, p. 
469). Although there are some sectors demonstrating the higher efficiency of private firms, 
in many services neutral or contradictory results prevailed.  
 
In transition economies, privatisation has proven its worth in Polish manufacturing 
(Barbone et al., 1999) and in Russia (Earle, Estrin, 1998). The evidence from Polish 
manufacturing (Barbone et al., 1999) indicates that private firms underwent faster 
restructuring than public ones, which confirms the theoretical expectations of Boycko et al. 
(1996). However, several empirical studies for transition economies cast some doubt on 
these expectations. In many transition countries there have been almost no differences in 
the performance of state-owned and private firms (see Earle et al., 1994, for Russia and 
Barrell, Holland, 2000, for Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic). Frydman et al. 
(1999) found on a large sample of Czech, Polish and Hungarian firms that privatisation is 
sensitive to performance measures. It has a most profound beneficial effect on revenue 
growth but, contrary to expectations, no significant effect on cost reductions. Moreover, 
privatised firms have boosted rather than hindered employment. Finally, privatisation has 
fallen short of its expectations in institutionally weak economies, mainly in the former 
Soviet Union. The reason for privatisation’s failure lies in the fact that the necessary 
supportive institutional environment, enforcing financial discipline, competition and the 
free entry of new companies, has not been attended to (Nellis, 1999).  
 
Evidence suggesting that many transition governments lack the administrative skills and 
political capacity to restructure under state ownership is also provided by Djankov (1999), 
who therefore suggests to privatise rapidly without attempting to restructure enterprises 
                                                 
5  See also Megginson et al. (1994) as the most cited evidence lately on the superior performance of 
privatised firms.  
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prior to privatisation. Commander et al. (1999) conclude that while debate continues 
regarding the extent to which improvements in performance have been exclusively driven 
by ownership change or associated increases in competition, the empirical evidence points 
to the joint importance of strong and well-enforced ownership and control structures 
coupled with effective competition. Similarly, Dutz and Vagliasindi argue that changes in 
ownership without proper attention to the distribution and subsequent exchange of 
controlling rights can impede restructuring (Commander et al., 1999). Empirical studies, 
therefore, lead to the conclusion that privatisation (the ownership structure of a company) 
is an important, but not the sole, determinant of company efficiency. Without being 
accompanied by deregulation and enhanced competition, privatisation simply does not 
deliver the expected results.  
 
Insider versus outsider ownership 
 
Ambiguous findings on how privatisation affects company performance have inspired 
numerous studies that sought to find out whether the different ownership forms of 
privatised companies have distinct effects. The influence of insider versus outsider 
ownership has attracted particular attention.  
 
There is no theoretical consensus on how insider or outsider ownership influences 
company performance. The advocates of insider ownership within the framework of the 
theory of the economics of participation stress the positive effects of employee 
participation in decision-making and/or in profit-sharing (Vanek, 1970, 1977; Jones, 
Svejnar, 1982). Nuti (1988) pointed to three positive consequences of employees’ 
participation in decision-making: 1. participation increases workers’ motivation for work 
and decreases their discontent with work and work alienation as workers have a say in the 
division of labour and work organisation; 2. participation in decision-making reduces the 
number and intensity of conflicts in the work place as it increases workers’ identification 
with the company and enhances workers’ acceptance of unpopular managerial decisions; 
and 3. participation in decision-making compensates workers’ exposure to job- and 
income-risk by increasing their power. Further, participation in profit-sharing increases 
labour productivity through the more intelligent and effective use of effort, through the 
more intensive co-operation with other workers and management and through the 
improved employee’s morale, which reduces absenteeism at work and betters the 
monitoring and supervision of each other’s efforts, efficiency and co-operation. Next, 
insider companies have a longer average labour tenure, which generates better incentives 
among employees for further education (increasing human capital) and companies have a 
greater interest in training their labour force, altogether representing a competitive edge for 
the company (Estrin et al., 1987). Another positive feature is the internalisation of the 
principal-agent problem (Ellerman, 1993). Namely, by increasing insider ownership more 
agents (managers and employees) become principals (owners) at the same time.  
 
On the other hand, economists point to the negative effects of insider ownership. First, the 
free-rider effect can wipe out any financial incentives from profit-sharing, especially in big 
companies where neither direct supervision of employees nor supervision among 
employees themselves is possible, whereas participation in decision-making slows down 
and hinders the process of decision-making (Jensen, Meckling, 1979). In companies with 
majority insider ownership the process of restructuring is hindered due to insufficient 
investment and flexibility. One reason for such low investment is that for risk-averse 
employees a company’s survival (i.e. job maintenance) is more important than any higher 
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dividends due to higher profits. This argument is particularly strong in the period of 
transition, which is accompanied by a lack of jobs and an undeveloped job market. Another 
reason for low investment is that money spent on investment is money not spent on wages, 
which is not in the (short-term) interest of employees. Finally, low investment is associated 
with limited access to external financial sources due to the fear of potential investors that 
the value of their shares and/or the size of their dividend payments will be reduced because 
employees use the increased profits to increase their wages. This argument is also strongly 
advocated by Aghion and Blanchard (1999). In their view, restructuring is crucial for 
improving company performance. It requires outsider ownership as insider firms lack the 
ability to attract external financ ial resources and expertise. Their theoretical findings have 
implications for privatisation programmes. They should be set in such a way to enable a 
rapid switch of shares to outsiders, if this was not envisaged in the initial stage of 
privatisation. Boycko et al. (1996) extended their theoretical findings about the superiority 
of private ownership to expose the advantages of outsider ownership. The objective 
function of outsider owners (i.e. outsiders) is farther away from politicians, so that even 
when politicians can use subsidies to convince privatised companies not to restructure it is 
more likely that restructuring will take place anyway. However, as Boycko et al. (1996) 
warn, if external investors happen to be mutual funds or industrial holding companies, 
controlled by politicians, which may be a real threat in Russia or in Poland, outsider 
ownership may not promote any restructuring. Hence, outsider ownership is effective only 
when the large block holders are private investors, whose objective is profit maximisation. 
 
Many empirical studies on transition economies have focused on the effects of outsider 
versus insider ownership using several dependent variables. Their findings are contentious. 
The only area of agreement regarding the ownership structure seems to be foreign 
ownership. It has been universally acknowledged that foreign ownership is superior to any 
other form of ownership (Halpern, Kõrösi, 2000; Barell, Holland, 2000; Smith et al., 1997; 
Djankov, 1998). Otherwise, several studies have found no significant influence of 
ownership structure on either performance or restructuring (Earle et al., 1994; Anderson et 
al., 1999; Djankov, 1998). Anderson et al. (1999) see the reason in highly dispersed 
outsider ownership in the hands of individual owners whose ownership is therefore not 
instrumental in exercising effective governance.  
 
Although the majority of studies seem to show no differential ownership structure effect on 
performance, there is also some evidence in support of the theoretical considerations. A 
substantial positive effect of outsider-owned firms on revenue and productivity growth has 
been demonstrated by Frydman et al. (1999) on a sample of 506 mid-size manufacturing 
firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the autumn of 1994. On the other 
hand, they found no significant differences in cost reductions among state-owned, insider 
and outsider firms.  
 
As a response to the somewhat disappointing findings on ownership structure, some 
studies concentrated on the differential effects of the structure of either insider ownership 
itself or outsider ownership. The study by Derek et al. (1998) on a sample of Bulgarian 
companies from the early transition period indicates no differences in performance 
irrespective of whether companies are managerially controlled, labour-managed, mutually 
controlled by managers and workers or if they have a moderate degree of workers’ 
influence. This contradicts the later findings of Djankov and Pohl (1998) on a sample of 21 
case studies of Slovak enterprises at the end of 1996. Contrary to the expectations of 
Aghion and Blanchard (1999), insider firms did not hinder restructuring as the owners in 
 8 
fact behaved as outsiders or were selling controlling stakes to outsiders to attract fresh 
financial resources. This is more likely to occur when managers purchase their shares 
rather than receive them for free in voucher privatisation schemes as, in the latter case, 
managers perceive their newly acquired ownership as a windfall gain, so their incentive for 
restructuring diminishes (Djankov, 1999, on a sample of firms from Georgia and Moldova 
in 1995-97). These findings allow us to conclude that insider ownership is not harmful but 
only if insider owners (i.e. insiders) resemble the behaviour of outsiders. Unfortunately, 
this is not always the case. Observations made by Filatotchev et al. (1999) on the 
behaviour of Russian managers in insider companies show, in line with Aghion and 
Blanchard’s (1999) theoretical predictions, that they are hostile towards outsiders and  
effectively collude with other employees to preserve insider control. 
 
Empirical studies on the ownership structure in Slovenia 
 
Studies on privatised companies carried out in Slovenia have so far mainly examined the 
influence of a new ownership structure on company performance. Smith et al. (1997) 
examined the influence of employee and foreign ownership on the performance of 
manufacturing companies in the early period of spontaneous privatisation (1989-1992). 
The results showed that companies with dominant employee and foreign ownership were 
more likely to generate higher revenues, profits and exports. Next, analyses carried out by 
Simoneti et al. (1998a, 1998b) show that in the 1994-1997 period, when companies were 
preparing and implementing privatisation under the Law on Ownership Transformation6, 
outsider companies were increasing investment in capital (fixed) assets, the number of 
employees and sales revenues, which is considered as active restructuring, whereas insider 
companies were still in the phase of passive restructuring accompanied by redundancies, 
disinvestment, slower growth in sales revenues and more intensive borrowing (Simoneti et 
al., 1998a, 1998b). However, by comparing the average financial and performance 
measures for both groups, the study was not able to explain whether ownership structure is 
the only reason for such differences. Another observation was that insider companies 
tended to transfer more of their enhanced productivity gains into wages, which resulted in 
a reduced potential for internal development financing. Prašnikar and Svejnar (2000) also 
found, on a sample of 458 Slovenian firms in 1991-1995, such a trade-off between wages 
and investments in insider companies, whereas this trade-off was not present in outsider 
companies. Nevertheless, the reason for this may be that a lot of these companies incurred 
losses at that time and therefore did not have the opportunity to divert profits from 
investment to wages. Further, the study shows the significantly positive effect of value 
added on investments in internally-owned firms. While outsider firms have developed 
easier access to external suppliers of funds, insider firms rely more heavily on internally 
accumulated resources. Finally, outsider firms, which are on average loss-makers, have 
appropriated part of the money for wages out of depreciation. This behaviour has not been 
observed in insider companies, as the workers and managers, who will eventually own 
these companies, tend to replace worn-out capital. However, they pay wages at the expense 
                                                 
6  The legislative basis for privatisation (or, better put, ownership transformation) in Slovenia was laid by 
the Law on Ownership Transformation (1992). Ownership transformation aimed to find the owners of 
companies. This may have also involved the state, state funds, managers and employees. Thus, in our 
paper the notion privatisation in fact refers to ownership transformation. For more on ownership 
transformation in Slovenia see, for example, Mencinger (1996) and Hrovatin (1999). Most firms selected 
their pattern of privatisation in 1995 and 1996; however, the majority of the processes started were 
completed with a one-year delay in 1996 or 1997 (ARP, 1999).  
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of a current surplus, which may have spillover effects and weaken the competitive position 
of transition economies (Prašnikar, Svejnar, 2000). 
 
In contrast to studies made by Simoneti et al. (1998a, 1998b), referring to the period when 
privatisation was still in progress, studies carried out by Prašnikar and Gregoriè (1999) and 
Prašnikar et al. (1999) examine companies’ behaviour in the post-privatisation period. In 
the post-privatisation period the internal exchange of shares, exchange of shares between 
investment and state funds and the listing of companies on the stock market have all taken 
place. All these processes have caused changes in the initial ownership structure of 
companies in the direction of increased ownership shares of managers, investment funds 
and state funds. As a result, one can expect that modalities in ownership are no longer 
dominant factors underlying performance. In insider companies, managers may have 
started obtaining greater ownership shares and, consequently, pursuing the same goals as 
outsiders. On the other hand, investment companies and state funds as outsiders have not 
tended to diversify their portfolios as expected, but have instead concentrated their 
ownership and actively intervened in the operations of enterprises while pursuing their 
share of profit in order to recover their management costs.  
 
Another study from the post-privatisation period by Prašnikar and Gregoriè (1999) 
indicates that, in the group of companies where managerial influence prevails, insiders 
have the biggest ownership share. Key strategies of this group of companies include 
company growth, orientation to market niches, expansion of markets, diversification, own 
R&D activity and the internationalisation of operations. Among strategic goals, the 
emphasis is on financial goals, liquidity, closing of non-profit-making programmes and 
assuring appropriate standards of employees. All this confirms that consolidating 
ownership in the hands of managers makes them behave like outsiders. A study on 
restructuring of Slovenian companies in the post-privatisation period (Prašnikar et al., 
1999) analyses the differences between companies with majority (more than 50%) and 
companies with minority (less than 50%) employee representation on the supervisory 
board, which is on the authors’ assumption a good alternative variable for employees’ 
influence on decision-making. In accordance with the expectations, the second group of 
companies is more successful in defensive restructuring with its core problem being 
dismissing employees who are at the same time owners of the company and participants in 
decision-making. On average, this group managed to reduce employment by almost 60% in 
the 1989-1996 period, whereas the reduction in the first group of companies was 35% on 
average. On the other hand, in terms of profitability, solvency and financing, the difference 
between the two groups is decreasing on average and the study reveals no relevant 
differences between the two groups in strategic restructuring. 
 
To conclude, Slovenian studies indicate that certain differences between companies with 
majority insider or majority outsider ownership existed primarily at the beginning of the 
restructuring process while, later on in the post-privatisation period, these differences have 
started to disappear as a consequence of structural changes in ownership and the beginning 
of the strategic phase of restructuring. However, these studies were either conducted in the 
early stages of transition in the pre-privatisation period (Smith et al., 1997) or concentrated 
on other relationships rather than ownership effects on performance, measured by value 
added or sales (Prašnikar et al., 1999; Prašnikar, Gregoriè, 1999; Prašnikar, Svejnar, 2000) 
or have not controlled for other factors other than ownership (Simoneti et al., 1998a, 
1998b, 2000). Our study attempts to illuminate the effects of the ownership structure on 
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performance while controlling for other factors that may also influence performance, 
measured by value added.  
 
 Competition and size 
 
The belief that competition is beneficial for society dates back to Adam Smith. However, 
this belief has not been supported either by strong theoretical arguments or by any 
substantial empirical evidence (Nickell, 1996). Ignoring the neo-classical theory of market 
structures, more recent theoretical foundations in support of the advantages of competition 
have been deve loped in the framework of managerial and workers’ incentives. After giving 
a survey of these more recent foundations, Nickell (1996) carefully concludes that there is 
some theoretical support for believing that competition affects productivity, although it is 
not strong. More persuasive than empirical findings is, in his view, the evidence of low 
productivity levels in Eastern Europe due to the absence of market forces.  
 
Challenged by this commonly acknowledged fact, several empirical studies seek to ident ify 
the effect of competition on performance in transition economies. They have provided 
mixed results, driven to a certain extent by differences in competition and performance 
measures. Earle and Estrin (1998) found little support for the belief that competition has 
started to play a significant role in Russia. On the other hand, Brown and Brown (1998) 
found a strong positive link between national concentration and profitability when firms 
are geographically dispersed. Similarly, Djankov (1999) demonstrated a positive influence 
of competition in the final product market on the restructuring of insider-dominated firms 
in Georgia and Moldova. Strong positive effects of concentration have also been seen in 
Bulgaria in the late communist and early transition period (Jones et al., 1998). On the other 
hand, Konigs (1997) reported mixed results on how competition affects sales in Hungary, 
Romania and Slovenia. Finally, the influence of concentration on performance can also be 
reversed, as Halpern and Kõrösi (2000) have demonstrated for Hungary. Efficient firms 
have been more successful in gaining higher market shares. Besides competition, the size 
of a firm can also exhibit differing effects on performance. Barbone et al. (1999) have, for 
example, found that the size of Polish firms, measured by number of employees, has an 
impact on labour productivity, but only in public companies. 
 
A number of empirical studies controlling for competition has inspired us to examine its 
importance in the operation of Slovenian firms. We expect that its effect may be even more 
profound as market forces played more active role in the former self-management 
environment, as it was the case in other centrally planned societies.  
 
 Export orientation 
 
When domestic markets are small, which certainly is the case in Slovenia, domestic 
competition may have a substantial impact on firm performance. Export-oriented firms 
should adopt efficient management styles, know-how and organisation to be able to 
compete with their counterparts in developed economies. In normal economic conditions, 
mainly successful companies are exporters since they must be able to minimise costs in 
order to meet strong competition in world markets. Slovenian firms chiefly compete with 
EU companies, as up to 70% of Slovenian exports go there. Exporting also allows 
companies to achieve economies of scale (the Slovenian market is for most industries too 
small to allow such economies) which leads to cost reductions. As former socialist 
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countries have been recognised for having high levels of industrial concentration, exposure 
to the pressure of competitive forces in foreign markets may result in even more 
pronounced benefits (Blanchard et al., 1993). An export-orientation has also been 
recognised as a relevant factor for Yugoslav firms by Prašnikar et al. (1992) and by Jones 
et al. (1998) for Bulgaria in the late communism and early transition period.  
 
In spite of the strong arguments supporting the positive impact of exports on performance 
based on efficiency and economies of scale, it has to be mentioned that in special 
macroeconomic conditions exports could produce a reversed effect. Such conditions 
prevailed in Slovenia after its independence. Faced by the loss of ex-Yugoslav markets, 
companies were forced to export to the more competitive EU markets, where they had to 
adjust to tremendous competitive pressures. Further, in this period the Slovenian currency 
(tolar) appreciated in real terms which, in addition, had a negative effect on the 
competitiveness of Slovenian exporters and, consequently, on their value added. Due to 
these factors, we can expect that an export orientation could also bring about a negative 
impact. 
 
2. Selected variables   
 
The existing empirical studies can be split into two groups reflecting whether they use 
absolute levels of dependent variables (i.e. various performance and efficiency measures) 
or their changes over a certain period of time. The first approach focuses on how the 
absolute levels of a dependent variable vary with the variables that may influence 
performance, whereas the second approach aims to identify those factors that have a 
decisive impact on restructuring as a dependent variable rather than on performance or 
efficiency. Examples of the second approach are studies by Djankov and Pohl (1998) and 
Djankov (1999), although many others have also used at least some restructuring measures. 
Our study strives to present the initial evidence on the driving factors of performance, so it 
employs the first approach. Following Jones et al. (1998), we use the theoretically 
preferable value added as a measure of performance rather than sales. The chosen set of 
explanatory variables includes: capital, labour, internal ownership, ownership by the state 
and municipalities, market share and the share of export sales in total sales. 7 
 
The variables of capital and labour are the basic production resources. The capital input is 
measured in a standard way, as fixed assets. We use the book value of fixed assets, which 
accounts for inflation since the Slovenian Accounting Standards require annual 
adjustments of all accounting categories to reflect inflation. The labour input is measured 
as the average number of employees. It has been calculated on the basis of working hours. 
Unfortunately, it was impossible to measure labour input as production-worker 
equivalents, which would be a preferable indicator. 
 
In order to examine the influence of ownership structure on performance, we tested for 
insider ownership (and consequently outsider ownership as these two categories are 
substitutes) and ownership by the state and municipalities. These three ownership forms 
seem to be prevalent in Slovenia in the post-privatisation period. As Aghion and Blanchard 
                                                 
7  Data on all variables was obtained from the data sets of two Slovenian institutions: the Agency of the 
Republic of Slovenia for Restructuring and Privatisation (ARP) and the Agency of the Republic of 
Slovenia for Payments, Auditing and Informing. The data set of the latter is based on balance sheets and 
income statements. The precise calculation of variables is given in Table 4 in the Appendix. 
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(1999) assumed for transition economies, the political considerations in Slovenia, quite 
aware of the attitudes of workers and managers towards socially-owned companies, have 
favoured the insider ownership model. Thus, the combination of: 1. management and 
employee buy-outs at 50% discounts, 2. free exchange of shares for the vouchers of 
managers, employees and their relatives and 3. The compulsory transfer of 40% of the 
initial social capital scheduled for privatisation to two state funds (20% of shares) and 
investment funds (20%) was the most popular ownership transformation method. Foreign 
ownership played a negligible part in Slovenia’s ownership transformation, so it is omitted 
in our analysis.  
 
Regarding direct state ownership (i.e. without state funds), the process of ownership 
transformation led to a quite significant state share in the initial social capital scheduled for 
privatisation due to the shift of network assets, agricultural land, forests and some 
insolvent enterprises into the state’s hands. This has influenced the ownership structure of 
some sectors more than others. In our sample, the energy and mining sectors have a large 
state share because the majority of companies became state-owned. We included this 
variable in order to test whether state ownership has the theoretically predicted negative 
effect on company performance. State ownership is expressed as a percentage of state 
ownership in total ownership. 
 
The next variable included in the analysis is market share as a measure of the degree of 
concentration and hence competition in product markets. It is measured as the percentage 
share of a firm’s sales in the sales of the industry, where the industry is defined at the two-
digit level according to the Standard Classification of Activities8. The last variable, export 
orientation, is measured as the share of exports in sales. As already noted, the effect of this 
explanatory variable is expected to be positive, although in some special macroeconomic 
conditions it may be the opposite. 
 
3. The sample 
 
Our study is based on data for all Slovenian industrial9 companies in 1998 that had by then 
completed their ownership transformation. This amounted to 509 companies. Before 
commencing the analysis, we excluded from the sample: 
1. companies for which some data was missing; 
2. companies with negative or zero value added; and 
3. companies with zero employees and/or zero capital. 
 
A large number of companies with zero employees and/or zero capital appeared in 
Slovenia in the first half of the nineties after the passing of liberal legislation that removed 
barriers to establishing a new company. Many individuals founded a new company to take 
advantage of tax exemptions and reductions in purchasing durables and the like. These 
companies were, in fact, fictitious, as they never de facto performed any business 
operations. After these deductions, our sample consists of 488 companies with 117,120 
employees. This was almost one-third of all industrial companies in Slovenia in 1998 
                                                 
8   This is a Slovenian classification of activities based on the NACE Rev.1. 
9  Industrial companies in our analysis are companies that under the Standard Classification of Activities 
belong to the following industries: mining (sector C), manufacturing (sector D) and electricity, gas and 
water supply (sector E).  
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employing more than half of all workers (Statistical Yearbook, 1999). Summary statistics 
for the sample are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for variables in the sample of privatised Slovenian industrial 
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* SIT – abbreviation and currency code for the Slovenian currency, the tolar 
 
VA – value added, K – capital, L – number of employees, MS – market share, EX – the 
share of exports in sales revenue, OWNINT – insider ownership, OWNS&M – ownership 
by the state and municipalities. 
 
 
The average company is a medium-sized enterprise employing 240 employees. The 
average market share of 15.67% indicates a certain degree of market power. The 
Herfindahl index is 1900, indicating that companies operate in tight oligopoly conditions. 
On average, they generated 31% of sales revenues from exports in 1998. Insiders owned 
46% of company’s shares on average in 1998, whereas the ownership by the state and 
municipalities was 3%. Nevertheless, state ownership in manufacturing (D) was on 
average less than 1%, while in the mining and quarrying sector (C) and in electricity, gas 
and water utilities (E) the state had 13% and 44%, respectively.  
 
4. Econometric considerations and results 
 
Empirical studies examining the determinants of firm performance in transition economies 
have applied two fundamental approaches. The first approach uses the conventional 
production function, which can be specified so that it allows for various technological 
forms. This approach has been the most common in transition economies. The second 
approach is based on the estimation of stochastic frontiers and has been implemented for 
the purposes of estimating privatisation effects on performance in transition countries only 
by Jones et al. (1998) in addition to conventional production function. Finally, several 
studies have been conducted within the scope of the production function and stochastic 
frontier approach. They applied a regression analysis to estimate the effects of various 
factors such as profitability, labour productivity, employment, payments, capacity 
utilisation, the vintage of capital stock, asset sales etc. on performance. In our study, we 
applied the production function which is the dominant econometric approach. 
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In order to control for production technology, we estimated three forms of the production 
function: Cobb-Douglas, Kmenta’s linear approximation to the CES (Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution) and the translog production function. The last one is the most flexible as it 
allows variations in the elasticity of substitution when the volumes of capital and/or labour 
change (Leighton, 1985). The specifications of estimated10 production functions in 
logarithmic forms are as follows: 
 
1. Cobb-Douglas production function 
 
uMOWNSOWNINTEXMSLKVA +++++++= &lnlnln 6543210 bbbbbbb            (1) 
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First, the F test (and Lagrange multiplier test) shows that for all three specifications the 
extended model including firm-specific variables is superior to the basic specification with 
capital and labour as the only inputs.11 Next, the F  test was used for testing the Cobb-
Douglas production technology imposed on the model against the CES and translog.  
 
Estimations have confirmed that the translog function best fits the data.12 All three 
functional forms were also tested for heteroscedasticity using White’s test. As 
heteroscedasticity was present in all three specifications, we corrected the models 
accordingly.  
                                                 
10    All three production functions were also estimated separately for sectors C, E and six groups consisting 
of related subsectors from sector D in order to explore the potential differences among them. Results, 
mostly confirming findings based on the whole sample, may be obtained from the authors. 
11  The F statistic was used to test our extended production function [VA = 
f(K,L,MS,EX,OWNINT,OWNS&M)] against the basic production function [VA = f(K,L)]. The F statistics 
for Cobb-Douglas, CES and translog production functions are 8.55, 8.52 and 8.45, respectively. The 1% 
critical value of F statistic for all three production functions is 3.48. Thus, the null hypothesis that the 
regression coefficients of market share, export and both ownership variables are jointly zero is rejected 
and the extended model is recognised as superior. 
12  To test the CES production function against the Cobb-Douglas production function we formed the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient of variable ( )2lnln
2
1
LK - equals zero. The calculated F statistic is 0.003, 
which is less than its critical value, i.e. 3.92. The F statistic and its critical value for testing the translog 
production function against the Cobb-Douglas production function ( H0 3 4 5 0:b b b= = = ) are 5.91 and 
3.95, respectively, indicating that the translog production function fits the data better. 
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Table 2: Estimated coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas, CES and translog production 





Constant     11.147**   10.064*  13.403* 
 (18.968) (2.038) (2.351) 
ln K     0.215** 0.335 0.260 
 (6.343) (0.529) (0.346) 
ln L     0.807** 0.691 -0.574 
 (20.189) (1.090) (-0.661) 
1/2  (ln K - ln L)2  -0.007  
  (-0.169)  
ln K * ln L    0.114 
   (1.915) 
1/2  (ln K)2   -0.0267 
   (-0.534) 
1/2  (ln L)2        -0.1975** 
   (-2.548) 
MS     0.454**    0.424**  0.333* 
 (3.338) (3.136) (2.300) 
EX     -0.260**     -0.264**     -0.236** 
 (-2.819) (-2.872) (-2.637) 
OWNINT     0.553**     0.631**    0.871** 
 (2.576) (2.948) (3.967) 
OWNS&M 0.282 0.292 0.129 
 (1.757) (1.615) (0.584) 
    
n 488 488 488 
R2adj. 0.8633 0.8633 0.8682 
n   - number of companies 
R 2 adj.  - adjusted R-squared 
 




Econometric results reported in Table 2 show that the market share, the share of exports 
and the share of insider ownership have a statistically significant influence on value added, 
whereas ownership by the state and municipalities does not. Market share has a positive 
influence on value added, although the effect is not very remarkable. In fact, it is far lower 
than in Bulgarian companies in early transition (Jones et al., 1998). The positive influence 
is in accordance with the theoretical assumption that companies with a larger market share 
have on average greater market power which enables them to set prices above the 
equilibrium level, to price discriminate and/or to exploit economies of scale. However, we 
cannot determine which of the three effects prevailed in our situation.  
 
The influence of exports is negative. This outcome was somehow expected. First, due to 
the special macroeconomic circumstances involved and, second, due to the exchange rate 
policy. As mentioned before, after Slovenia’s secession and the collapse of the ex-
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Yugoslav market companies had to divert their exports to the highly competitive EU 
markets, where they faced serious difficulties in their endeavours to catch up with their 
more efficient counterparts. Another reason was the exchange rate policy causing the 
steady appreciation of the Slovenian tolar in real terms. In 1998, the Slovenian tolar 
appreciated even more strongly as a result of nine months of continuous appreciation 
starting in 1997 and lasting until June 1998. As a consequence, labour costs in the basket 
of currencies increased substantially (by 3%), whereas at the same time labour costs per 
product of Slovenia’s main trading partners fell by about 2% in 1998, which caused a 
deterioration in the international competitiveness of Slovenia’s manufacturing industry 
(Economic Mirror, 1999a, 1999b). Our finding of the negative impact of exports is 
comparable with the results of Jones et al. (1998) for Bulgaria. Their explanations based on 
the loss of Eastern and Yugoslav markets are partly similar to ours. In addition, they 
suggest that firms that once sold to domestic markets have diverted their efforts to make 
exports in order to compensate for the loss of sales. In this way, the “self-selection of the 
worst firms” (Jones et al., 1998, p. 458) among exporters may have occurred. In Slovenia, 
exporters have in general been those firms that had been exporting to other Yugoslav 
republics before secession. Competition there was at least as tough as in the domestic 
market, so the “self-selection of the worst firms” among exporters was less likely to occur. 
 
Our findings on the positive impact of insider ownership contradict previous Slovenian 
empirical studies. Following Prašnikar and Gregoriè (1999), this could be explained by 
structural changes, namely the sufficient consolidation of ownership shares in the hands of 
managers, who therefore act as outsiders. Taking this into consideration, one may further 
assume that insiders have already bought out the majority of reserved privatisation shares 
from the state Development Fund, so that there is no significant outflow of firm resources 
for their purchases anymore which would in turn reduce investment resources. On the other 
hand, the concentration of outsider ownership on a larger scale was less likely to occur 
before the end of 1998, as the majority of firms had not traded their shares on the capital 
market13. Therefore, we argue that the positive effect of internal ownership can also be 
attributable to the inefficient structure of outsider ownership. It was highly dispersed 
among outsiders, investment funds and individual owners who, consequently, could not 
have effectively enforced their ownership rights. In the absence of the effective gove rnance 
mechanism of the state and investment funds themselves, outsiders were more inclined to 
passive representation on the management boards involved. In addition, these funds tended 
to share-out company profits in order to cover their operating costs. Another plausible 
argument for the positive effect of insider ownership can be seen in the management 
turnover that took place at the end of the 1980s. As a result, managers in insider companies 
were highly experienced and knowledgeable in the (post)-privatisation period. Contrary to 
theoretical expectations, there is also a positive influence of the ownership by the state and 
municipalities on value added, although this effect is not significant.  
 
The presented analysis reflects only the direct effect of each variable on value added. 
However, these variables can also influence value added indirectly in conjunction with 
other variables, or can even have a different influence on value added in some other size 
ranges. In order to explore these relationships, we calculated the total (aggregate) effect of 
market share, exports, insider ownership and ownership by the state and municipalities on 
                                                 
13  At the end of 1998 only 29 companies traded their shares on the Ljubljana Stock Exchange and 63 on the 
free market. Market capitalisation accounted for only 16.6% of GDP at the end of 1997 (Ljubljana Stock 
Exchange, 1998). This is far less than the EU average (69.9% of GDP) (Lannoo, 1999).  
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value added. This was achieved by estimating the production function with the original 
















0 bbb ,                                                    (4) 
 
where VA stands for value added, xi , represents the i-th explanatory variable and jiij bb = . 
Total effects (elasticities) were then explored by calculating the following derivatives of 































Table 3: Total effects (elasticities)  
 
Variables Elasticity 
MS   1.029 
EX - 0.330 
OWNINT   1.087 
OWNS&M   0.428 
 
 
The elasticities reported in Table 3 have the same signs as in the earlier estimations. 
However, as expected the total influence of variables is stronger than their direct effect. 
Insider ownership and market share have the strongest total influence on value added. On 
the margin, a percentage point increase in insider ownership and market share is associated 
with an approximately 1% increase in value added. A lower yet still considerable influence 
on value added is detected for ownership by the state and municipalities. The share of 




Our econometric analysis has proved that ownership matters for performance, although it 
is not the only decisive factor. Insider ownership has, contrary to our expectations, a 
significant positive influence on value added. This can be explained in different ways. One 
reason may be seen in the inefficient structure of outsider ownership. In 1998, outsider 
ownership was highly dispersed among outsiders, i.e. the state and investment funds and 
individual owners. Funds participated with their ownership shares in the majority of 
companies that had accomplished ownership transformation. The wide dispersion of 
ownership, envisaged mainly with the formally prescribed ownership transformation 
scheme, prevented them from effectively enforcing the ir ownership rights. This was also 
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noted in Mongolia (Anderson et al., 1999). Another explanation for the supremacy of 
insider ownership comes from the management turnover that took place at the end of the 
eighties, resulting in a highly experienced and skilled management structure in insider 
firms in the (post)-privatisation period. Managerial influence (ownership), according to 
Prašnikar and Gregoriè (1999), prevailed in companies with the largest ownership share of 
insiders. These companies were oriented towards active restructuring (i.e. growth, market 
niches, expansion of markets, dive rsification, own R&D activity, internationalisation of 
operations and closing of non-profitable product lines). Similarly, as in the case of Slovak 
firms (Djankov, Pohl, 1998), we can assume that the consolidation of ownership in the 
hands of managers makes them behave like outsiders.  
 
This result also suggests that the preferable model of ownership transformation in 
Slovenia, resulting in the dominance of insider firms, may have been appropriately 
designed considering Slovenia’s unique institutional struc ture with a relatively high degree 
of managerial autonomy facilitated by social ownership in conjunction with market 
socialism. If this is true, then further concentration of ownership in the hands of managers 
would be welcome. On the other hand, concentration of ownership in the hands of 
outsiders so that they can de facto exercise effective governance may also lead to the 
improved performance of outsider firms.  
 
Market share has as strong a positive aggregate influence on value added as insider 
ownership. This finding confirms our expectations that market share could play a more 
profound role in Slovenia compared to other transition countries since market forces 
worked more freely in the former Yugoslav socialist self-management system than in 
centrally-planned economies with dominant state ownership. The negative effect of 
exports, which would not be expected in normal economic conditions, is the result of the 
collapse of the former Yugoslav market and the reorientation of exports to competitive 
Western European markets. This was also the case in Bulgaria (Jones et al., 1998). Another 
reason for the negative effect in Slovenian firms was the strong appreciation of the 
Slovenian tolar in 1998. Finally, the ownership share of the state is the only variable 
having no statistically significant effect on firm performance. This may be due to the fact 
that manufacturing firms, which comprise the majority of our sample, have a negligible 
ownership share by the state and municipalities (less than 1%) and, therefore, in fact the 





Table 4: Definitions of variables 
 
Variable Variable calculation 
Value added in SIT (VA) gross operating profit - cost of sales - cost of materials  - cost of 
services - current asset abatement - other operating expenses  
Capital in SIT (K ) fixed assets - long-term financial investments  
Average number of  
employees (L) 
average number of employees on the basis of working hours in the 
fiscal period 
Market share in % (MS) (sales turnover of the company) / (sales turnover of the industry) 
The share of exports in sales 
revenues % (EX) 
net sales revenues from exports / total net sales turnover (from 
exports and domestic sales)  
Insider ownership  
in % (OWNINT) 
(internal purchase in instalments + internal purchase in cash + 
shares in exchange for certificates) / equity 
Ownership by the state and 
municipalities (OWNS&M) 









Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Restructuring and Privatisation (ARP), 1999: Ownership 
Transformation of Slovene Companies (in Slovene). Final Report. Ljubljana.  
Aghion, P., Blanchard, O.J., 1998. On privatization methods in Eastern Europe and their implications. 
Economics of Transition 6 (1), 87–99. 
Alchian, A., Demsetz, H., 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organisation. American 
Economic Review 62 (4), 777–795.  
Anderson, J.H., Young, L., Murrel, P., 1999. Do Competition and Ownership Affect Enterprise Efficiency in 
the Absence of Market Institutions? Evidence after Privatization in Mongolia. World Bank, 
University of Maryland and University of Maryland, USA. 
Barbone, L., Marchetti, D., Paternostro, S., 1999. The early stages of reform in Polish manufacturing. 
Economics of Transition 7 (1), 157–177. 
Barrell, R., Holland, D., 2000. Foreign direct investment and enterprise restructuring in Central Europe. 
Economics of Transition 8(2), 477–504. 
Blanchard, O., Dornbush, R. and Krugman, 1993. Reform in Eastern Europe. MIT, Cambridge, MA.  
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., Vishny R.W., 1996. A Theory of Privatisation. The Economic Journal 106 
(March), 309–319. 
Brown, A.N., Brown, D.J., 1998. Does Market Structure Matter? New Evidence from Russia. SITE Working 
Paper, No.130, June 1998. 
Clarke, T., Pitelis, C., 1993. Introduction: The Political Economy of Privatisation. In:  Clarke, T. (Ed.), 
Pitelis, C. (Ed.), The Political Economy of Privatisation. Routledge, London, pp. 205–233. 
Commander, S. J., Dutz, M., Stern, N., 1999. Restructuring in Transition Economies: Ownership, 
Competition and Regulation. Paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development 
Economics, April 1999, World Bank. 
Derek, J., Klinedinst, M., Rock, C., 1998. Productive Efficiency during Transition: Evidence from Bulgarian 
Panel Data. Journal of Comparative Economics 26 (3), 446–464. 
Djankov, S., 1998. Ownership Structure and Enterprise Restructuring in the (six) Newly Independent States. 
World Bank research paper, March 1998. 
Djankov, S., 1999. The restructuring of insider-dominated firms. A comparative analysis. Economics of 
Transition 7 (2), 476–479. 
Djankov, S., Pohl, G., 1998. The Restructuring of large firms in the Slovak Republic. Economics of 
Transition 6 (1), 67–85. 
Earle, J.S., Estrin, S., 1998. Privatization, Competition, and Budget Constraints: Disciplining Enterprises in 
Russia. SITE and London Business School, mimeo. 
Earle, J.S., Estrin, S., Leshchenko, L., 1994. Ownership Structures, Patterns of Control, and Enterprise 
Behaviour in Russia. In: Commander, S., Fan, Q., Schaffer, M., (Eds.), Enterprise Restructuring and 
Economic Policy in Russia. EDI Development Studies, the World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 205–252. 
Economic Mirror, 1999a, V (1), 10. 
Economic Mirror, 1999b, V (4), 8. 
Ellerman, D.P., 1993. Management and Employee Buy-Outs as a technique of Privatisation. CEEPN, 
Ljubljana. 
Estrin, S., Jones, C. D., Svejnar, J., 1987. The Productivity Effects of Worker Participation: Producer 
Cooperatives in Western Economies. Journal of Comparative Economics 11 (1), 40–61. 
Filatotchev, I., Wright, M., Belaney, M., 1999. Privatization, insider control and management entrenchment 
in Russia. Economics of Transition 7 (2), 481–504. 
FIPO (Financial data) [http://www.gvestnik.si/fipo/prva.htm]. 
Frydman, R., Gray, C., Hessel, M., Rapaczynski, A., 1999. When Does Privatization Work? The Impact of 
Private Ownership on Corporate Performance in the Transition Economies. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics CXIV (4), 1153–1191. 
Halpern, L., Kõrösi G., 2000. Efficiency and Market Share  in Hungarian Corporate Sector. Paper presented at 
the CEPR/WDI (Centre for Economic Policy Research and The William Davidson Institute) Annual 
International Conference on Transition Economics, Moscow, 2–5 July, 2000.  
Hayek, F.A., 1949. Economics and Knowledge. In: Hayek, F.A. (Ed.), Individualism and Economic Order. 
Routledge & Keagan and Paul, London. 
Hayek, F.A., 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review, 35 (4), 519–530.  
Hrovatin, N., 1999. Open Issues in Organisation, Ownership, Regulation and Governance of Public 
Enterprises. The Case of Slovenia. International Journal of Public-Private Partnerships 1 (2), 271–288. 
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1979. Rights and production functions: An application to labour-managed 
firms and codetermination. Journal of Business, 52, 469–506. 
 21 
Jones, D., Klinedinst, M., Rock, C., 1998. Productive Efficiency During Transition: Evidence from Bulgarian 
Panel Data. Journal of Comparative Economics 26 (3), 446–464. 
Jones, D.C., Svejnar, J., 1982. Partic ipatory and Self-Managed Firms. Lexington, MA. 
Lannoo K., 1999. A European Perspective on Corporate Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies 
(UK) 37 (2), 269–294.  
Ljubljana Stock Exchange, 1998. Annual Report 1998. Ljubljana.  
Konigs, J., 1997. Competition and Firm Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence form Firm Level 
Surveys in Slovenia, Hungary and Romania. CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 1770. 
Kornai, J., 1980. Economics of Shortage. North Holland, Amsterdam.  
Leighton, R. T., 1985. Introductory Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Longman, London & New 
Yourk. 
Megginson, W., Nash, C.R., van Randeborgh, M., 1994. The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly 
Privatized firms: An International Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Finance 49 (2), 403–452.  
Megginson, W.L., Netter, J. M., 2001. From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatisation. 
Journal of Economic Literature 39 (2), 321–390. 
Mencinger, J., 1996. Privatization experiences in Slovenia. Annales de l’economie publique sociale et 
cooperative 67 (3), 415–228.  
Nellis, J., 1999. Time to Rethink Privatisation in Transition Economies? The World Bank, Washington D.C., 
mimeo. 
Nickell, S.J., 1996. Competition and Corporate Performance. Journal of Political Economy 104 (4), 724–796. 
Nuti, D. M., 1988. Codetermination, Profit Sharing, and Full Employment. In: Jones, C. D., Svejnar, J. 
(Eds.), Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labour-Managed Firms. JAI Press, 
Greenwich & Connecticut & London, Vol. 3, pp. 169–183. 
Nuti D. M., 1995. Employeeism: Corporate governance and employee share ownership in transitional 
economies. London, mimeo. 
Prašnikar, J., Domadenik, P., Svejnar, J., 1999. Prestrukturiranje slovenskih podjetij v poprivatizacijskem 
obdobju. In: Prašnikar, J. (Ed.), Poprivatizacijsko obnašanje slovenskih podjetij. Gospodarski vestnik, 
Ljubljana, pp. 251–271. 
Prašnikar, J., Gregoriè, A., 1999. Delavska participacija v Sloveniji - deset let kasneje. In: Prašnikar, J. (Ed.), 
Poprivatizacijsko obnašanje slovenskih podjetij. Gospodarski vestnik, Ljubljana, pp. 27–56. 
Prašnikar, J., Svejnar, J., 1988. Economic Behaviour of Yugoslav Enterprises. In: Jones, C. D., Svejnar, J. 
(Eds.), Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labour-Managed Firms. JAI Press, 
Greenwich & Connecticut & London, Vol. 3, pp. 237–311. 
Prašnikar, J., Svejnar, J., 2000. Investment, Wages and Ownership during the Transition to a Market 
Economy: Evidence from Slovenian Firms. CEPR/WDI (Centre for Economic Policy Research and The 
William Davidson Institute) Annual International Conference on Transition Economics, Moscow, 2–5 
July, 2000. 
Prašnikar, J., Svejnar, J., Klinedinst, M., 1992. Structural adjustment policies and productive efficiency of 
socialist enterprises. European Economic Review 36 (4), 179–199. 
Rawski, T., 1997. China and the Idea of Economic Reform. Unpublished draft paper for Symposium on 
China’s gradualism Reconsidered, Yokohama, Japan; paper produced at the Department of Economics, 
Pittsburg University, March, 1997, pp. 14. 
Rowthorn, B., Chang, H., 1993. Public Ownership and the Theory of the State. In: Clarke, T., Pitelis, C. 
(Eds.), The Political Economy of Privatisation. Routledge, London, pp. 54–69. 
Shapiro, C., Willig, D.R., 1990. Economic rationales for the scope of privatisation. In: Suleiman, E.N., 
Waterbury, J. (Eds), The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization. Westview Press, 
London, pp. 55–87. 
Shirley, M., 1999. Bureaucrats in Business: The Rules of Privatization versus Corporatization in State-
Owned Enterprise Reform. World Development 27 (1), 115–136.  
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1994. Politicians and Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4), 995–1025. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance LII (2), 737–783. 
Simoneti, M., Jašoviè, B., Rems, M., Rojec, M., 1998a. Nekatere znaèilnosti poslovanja podjetij z notranjimi 
in zunanjimi lastniki. Slovenska ekonomska revija 49 (1/2), 130–148. 
Simoneti, M., Rojec, M., Rems, M., Jašoviè, B., 1998b. Uspešnost in operativne znaèilnosti poslovanja 
podjetij glede na lastniško strukturo v razdobju 1994–1997. In: Ovin, R. (Ed.), Sedanjost in prihodnost 
tranzicije v Sloveniji. Naše gospodarstvo, 3. Letna konferenca Znanstvene sekcije Zveze ekonomistov 
Slovenije, Bled, pp. 104–126. 
Simoneti, M., Rojec, M., Rems, M., 2000. Poslovanje slovenskega podjetniškega sektorja v razdobju 1994–
1998 z vidika lastniške strukture. IB revija 34 (2), 5–20.  
 22 
Smith, C. S., Cin, B.- C., Vodopivec, M., 1997. Privatisation Incidence, Ownership Forms and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Slovenia. Journal of Comparative Economics 25 (2), 158–179.  
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia 1999. Institute of the Republic of Slovenia for statistics, 
Ljubljana. 
Stiglitz, J., 1998. Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic Policy and Economic Advice. 
Paper given at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank. 
Tandon, P., 1995. Welfare Effects of Privatisation: Some evidence from Mexico. Boston University 
International Law Journal 13 (2), 329–330. 
Tang, K., 1997. Efficiency of the private sector: a critical review of empirical evidence from public services. 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 63 (4), 459–474. 
Vanek, J., 1970. The General Theory of Labour-Managed Market Economies. Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, New York. 
Vanek, J., 1977. The Labour-Managed Economy: Essays. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York. 
 
 
 
